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A CLOSELY-HELD COMPANIES ACT 
FOR NEW ZEALAND 
Matthew Farrington* 
This paper examines the law relating to closely-held companies. It concludes that the Companies 
Act's regulatory requirements imposed on directors to ensure accountability to shareholders do not 
have any benefit where companies are closely-held. The costs arising from such regulatory 
requirements are therefore unjustified.  
The paper therefore argues that New Zealand should adopt a new flexible and accessible statute 
designed to meet the needs of closely-held companies. This statute should be in addition to the 
existing Companies Act, and should be informed by comparative precedent. This paper argues that 
the key features of this statute should include removing the distinction between shareholders and 
directors. This in turn removes the need to impose regulatory requirements on directors in favour of 
shareholders. The other features relating to defining a closely-held company, limited liability, 
protections for creditors, and relations between "principals" are also considered in this paper. The 
net result is a simple, straightforward set of requirements suitable for closely-held companies in 
New Zealand, without onerous or unjustified compliance requirements.  
I INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the law relating to closely-held companies. The majority of companies in 
New Zealand are "closely-held". That is, the company's shareholders are also its directors – there is 
no separation of ownership and management. The best manner to regulate closely-held companies is 
therefore a particular issue for New Zealand. 
The paper considers the provisions of the Companies Act 1993 and in particular its regulatory 
requirements. The paper endeavours to show how many of the regulatory requirements, designed to 
ensure the accountability of a company's directors to its shareholders, are inappropriate for closely-
held companies. There is no benefit from such requirements for closely-held companies, rendering 
compliance with such requirements an unjustified cost. 
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The paper therefore concludes that New Zealand's current law is inadequate to meet the needs of 
closely-held companies and proposes changes to the existing law. The paper argues that the issues 
would be best addressed by a new statute designed to meet the needs of closely-held companies. It 
considers the general principles that may inform the design of such a statute, and makes specific 
design recommendations for the new statute. In the tradition of the Law Commission's proposals for 
company law reform,1 the paper also sets out possible draft clauses for the new statute. The 
recommendations for reform are based on this paper's empirical findings and identified issues. The 
paper is also influenced by comparative international precedent, particularly that of South Africa2 
and the United States.3 
II CLOSELY-HELD COMPANIES IN NEW ZEALAND 
This section of the paper analyses the nature of companies in New Zealand. In particular, it 
focuses on the ownership structure of New Zealand companies to attempt to determine the 
proportion that are "closely-held". For the purposes of this paper, a company is considered "closely-
held" if its owners (shareholders) are involved in, or close to (for example, through family ties), the 
management of that company.4  
A Number of Closely-Held Companies  
There are no direct statistics available on the exact number of companies with shareholders 
involved in management. The Small Business Advisory Group however, considers that the "typical" 
small and medium-sized enterprise will "have the owner as the only person in a managerial position, 
and no board or formal governance arrangements".5 Referencing the figures for small and medium-
sized businesses, some 96 per cent of New Zealand businesses fit within this category.6  
  
1  New Zealand Law Commission Company Law: Reform and Restatement (NZLC R9, Wellington, 1989), 
paras 5-7 ["Law Commission Company Law Report"]. 
2  Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA). 
3  This paper uses the examples of the Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat title 17, chapter 15 
(1977), and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Uniform Limited Liability 
Company Act (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Chicago, Illinois, 1996) 
http://www.nccusl.org (accessed 15 July 2006) [Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996)]. 
4  Other factors that may be considered in other contexts include the number of shareholders, lack of a market 
for the shares and even the geographical proximity and relationship of the shareholders with each other – 
see Baruch Gitlin "When Is Corporation Close, or Closely-Held, Corporation Under Common or Statutory 
Law" (2003) 111 ALR 5th 207, § 2[a]. 
5  Small Business Advisory Group Small and Medium Businesses in New Zealand: Report of the Small 
Business Advisory Group 2004 (Ministry of Economic Development, Wellington, 2004) 
http://www.med.govt.nz (accessed 18 August 2006) 3-4. The criteria for small or medium enterprises are 
not settled. The New Zealand statistics referenced in this paper primarily rely on the number of full time-
equivalent employees, with 5 or less representing a "small" business and 6 to 19 representing a "medium" 
business – see, in particular, Ministry of Economic Development SMEs in New Zealand: Structure and 
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This reflects Companies Office statistics:7 New Zealand has over 431,000 limited liability 
companies registered under the Companies Act. Of these companies, 140,000 have only one 
shareholder (33 per cent of all companies), 186,000 have two shareholders (43 per cent) and 80,000 
have three to five shareholders (18 per cent). In total, 408,000 companies (nearly 95 per cent) have 
five or fewer shareholders. The popularity of the limited liability company has undoubtedly been 
enhanced by matters such as a robust approach to limited liability,8 ease of incorporation,9 
succession and family planning advantages,10 and the potential for income splitting and lack of tax 
disadvantages.11 
While unification of ownership and management is not the same as a small number of 
shareholders in a company, there is some correlation between the number of shareholders and their 
involvement in management. In particular, it is necessary to have a relatively small number of 
shareholders to have them practicably involved in management (although this factor on its own is 
not sufficient to make a company closely-held). The number of shareholders therefore provides 
some guidance as to whether a company is closely-held or not. The exact number of shareholders 
beyond which it is not practicably possible for all shareholders to be involved in management is not 
settled in existing law. By any measure, however, it will be greater than five shareholders. Other 
New Zealand statutes that differentiate between different companies on the basis of number of 
shareholders without exception use a figure of at least five.12  
  
Dynamics – 2006 (Ministry of Economic Development, Wellington, 2006) www.med.govt.nz (accessed 18 
August 2006) 5-6. 
6  SMEs in New Zealand – Structure and Dynamics – 2006, ibid, 6. 
7  Companies Office Statistics (Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to the Companies 
Office, Business Services Branch, Ministry of Economic Development). See also www.companies.govt.nz 
(accessed 18 August 2006). Figures have been rounded to the nearest thousand. 
8  See Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL) and Lord Cooke of Thorndon "A Real Thing" in A 
Borrowdale, D Rowe and L Taylor (eds) Company Law Writings: A New Zealand Collection (The Centre 
for Commercial and Corporate Law, Christchurch, 2002) 21. 
9  To incorporate a company in New Zealand, a person is only required to complete a straightforward form 
and pay a fee – see Companies Act 1993, s 12 and Companies Act 1993 Regulations 1994, First Schedule, 
Form 1. This can be completed entirely on-line – see Companies Act 1993, s 360(4) and 
www.companies.govt.nz (accessed 18 August 2006). The fees are also very low – see Companies Act 1993 
Regulations 1994, reg 5 and Second Schedule, Part 1. 
10  See, for example, Maw v Maw [1981] 1 NZLR 25 (CA). 
11  See, in particular, Income Tax Act 2004, s HG1 (relating to loss attributing qualifying companies). 
12  See, for example, Takeovers Act 1993, s 2 definition of "specified company" and Takeovers Code, clause 3, 
definition of "code company", Financial Reporting Act 1993, s 6(g), Income Tax Act 2004, s HG1, and 
Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 2(1). 
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The above figures cannot be considered conclusive as to the number of closely-held companies 
in New Zealand. Not necessarily all of the 96 per cent of businesses that are small or medium-sized 
will be closely-held, nor the 95 per cent of companies that have five or fewer shareholders. Some 
may have shareholders that are not involved in management; others may be subsidiaries of larger 
widely-held companies with professional independent directors. Nevertheless, this paper considers 
that it is fair to conclude from the figures that closely-held companies make up a significant number 
of New Zealand companies. 
B Other Information 
Two other matters arising from the empirical information are also worth briefly noting: 
synonymity and informality. These are both characteristics of closely-held companies that are 
relevant for the purposes of this paper. 
1 Synonymity 
By definition, the directors of a closely-held company will also be its shareholders. There is 
obviously an alignment of interests in this respect. This synonymity is, however, reinforced by 
several other matters apparent from the empirical information. In particular, the livelihoods of 
directors/shareholders will be largely synonymous with the fortunes of their companies. A 
significant majority of small and medium-sized businesses' capital is contributed by the individuals 
in control of the business.13 This is compounded by the use of personal guarantees for debt finance. 
While only one-quarter to one-third of small-and-medium businesses seek loans,14 the 
directors/shareholders of those that do will probably have to give a personal guarantee for the debts 
of the company (there is, however, some conflicting data on this point).15 Finally, the 
directors/shareholders will probably also be employed by the business.16 This means that the 
principal(s) may also be dependent on the company for their day-to-day income. The 
directors/shareholders' invested capital, the family home and other assets, and day-to-day income 
may all be at risk in the event of business failure. 
  
13  See Statistics New Zealand Business Finance in New Zealand 2004) (Statistics New Zealand, Wellington, 
2004) www.stats.govt.nz (accessed 18 August 2006) 24 and 70. 
14  See ibid, 9 and 50. 
15  See PricewaterhouseCoopers Bank Lending Practices to Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (Ministry of 
Economic Development, Wellington, 2003) www.med.govt.nz (accessed 18 August 2006) 29-31, and Small 
Business Advisory Group Small and Medium Businesses in New Zealand: Report of the Small Business 
Advisory Group 2004, above n 5, 3. Note, however, PricewaterhouseCoopers Bank Lending Practices to 
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises, 30, and Statistics New Zealand Business Finance in New Zealand 
2004, above n 13, 30-31 and 78. 
16  Small Business Advisory Group Small and Medium Businesses in New Zealand: Report of the Small 
Business Advisory Group 2004, above n 5, 3, and Ministry of Economic Development SMEs in New 
Zealand: Structure and Dynamics – 2006, above n 5, 6. 
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2 Informality 
The empirical evidence also tends to indicate that most closely-held companies operate 
informally, and do not strictly observe all regulatory requirements.17 This lack of formal 
compliance can occur in a number of ways. Matters may be neglected by accident or oversight,18 
due to ignorance of the law or lack of capacity,19 failure to seek professional advice,20 or even by 
reckless or deliberate disregard of the legal requirements.21 In addition to non-compliance, 
"informal compliance" may also occur. For example, rather than attending to ongoing obligations as 
they are technically required, these obligations may be addressed in an end-of-year "wash-up" of 
legal requirements.22 
 
III IMPLICATIONS  
A Regulatory Requirements 
Company law imposes numerous regulatory requirements in an effort to prevent potential abuse 
of the corporate form. While some of these requirements fall on companies directly23 (and in some 
exceptional circumstances, shareholders),24 the majority of company regulation imposes 
requirements on directors, as the individuals with the power to control a company.25  
 
17  Small Business Advisory Group Small and Medium Businesses in New Zealand: Report of the Small 
Business Advisory Group 2004, above n 5, 3-4. See, for example, Mason v Lewis (2006) 9 NZCLC 264,024, 
para 58 (CA) Judgment of the Court. 
18  See, for example, Re Economy Service Ltd (alt cit Caddis v Roskam) (1997) 8 NZCLC 261,441 (HC). 
19  See, for example, Hale v Registrar of Companies (28 September 2006) HC AK CRI-2005-404-241; CRI-
2005-404-237, in particular paras 7, 9 and 10 Potter J. See also David Goddard "Company Law Reforms – 
Lessons from the New Zealand Experience" in A Borrowdale, D Rowe and L Taylor (eds) Company Law 
Writings: A New Zealand Collection, above n 8, 145, 166. 
20  See, for example, Business New Zealand and KPMG Summary Report of the Business New Zealand-KPMG 
Compliance Cost Survey (Business New Zealand and KPMG, Wellington, 2005) www.businessnz.org.nz 
(accessed 18 August 2006), Summary Tables and Graphs, Table 47, and Small Business Advisory Group 
Small and Medium Businesses in New Zealand: Report of the Small Business Advisory Group 2004, above n 
5, 3-4. 
21  See, for example, Re Cellar House Ltd (In Liquidation) (alt cit Walker v Allen) (18 March 2004) HC NEL 
CP13/00, paras 133, 143, 180 and 209-211 Ellen France J, and Mason v Lewis, above n 17, para 58 
Judgment of the Court. 
22  Goddard "Company Law Reforms – Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", above n 19, 165. 
23  For example, use of company name – see Companies Act 1993, s 25, in particular subs (5)(a).  
24  See, for example, McCullagh v Gellert (alt cit Re Gellert Developments Ltd (In Liquidation)) (2002) 9 
NZCLC 262,942 (HC). 
25  Companies Act 1993, s 128. 
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These regulatory requirements on directors take a number of forms, including: 
(1) Imposing general duties on directors;26 
(2) Substantive restrictions on certain actions;27 
(3) Structural distribution of powers within a company;28 and 
(4) Procedural requirements.29  
Generally, such requirements may be described as being for the benefit of shareholders and 
creditors30 – those in the position of relative vulnerability to abuse of the corporate form by 
directors. The interests of other stakeholders (for example, customers, employees, the environment 
and so on) are normally addressed outside company law in other specific legislation.31  
In relation to shareholders,32 the regulatory requirements have a number of specific aims. First, 
they make directors accountable to shareholders for actions that may prejudice the position of 
shareholders. This includes both liability to make good wrongs suffered by shareholders33 and 
liability to account for personal benefits gained that have been denied to shareholders.34 Second, 
  
26  See, for example, Companies Act 1993, ss 131-138. 
27  For example, prohibiting distributions in breach of the solvency test and prohibiting entering transactions 
that cannot satisfy the solvency test – see Companies Act 1993, ss 4, 52, 108 and 137. 
28  For example, reserving control of major transactions to shareholders – see Companies Act 1993, s 129. 
29  For example, the assorted "disclosure" requirements that are considered immediately below – see below, n 
36-39. 
30  See Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 19 and 23. 
31  See, for example, Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 17-19; L S Sealy "Directors' 
'Wider' Responsibilities – Problems Conceptual, Practical and Procedural" (1987) 13 Monash U LR 164; R 
Baxt "Can the Law Relating to Directors' Duties be Reformed?" (1990) 10 C and SLJ 110, 114-115; and 
Australian Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Company Directors' Duties 
(Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1989), paras 6.1 and following ["Cooney Report"].  
32  The position of creditors is discussed below – see Part V C Creditors, Limited Liability and Regulatory 
Requirements. 
33  For example, supervising the share register (see Companies Act 1993, ss 90 and 169(3)). This can be 
considered a "negative" duty – directors must not act against the interests of shareholders. 
34  For example, requiring directors to act in the best interests of the company (see Companies Act 1993, s 131) 
and restrictions on self-interested transactions (see Companies Act 1993, ss 139-140). This can be 
considered a "positive" duty – directors must act in the interests of shareholders. See, for example, Bridge v 
M B Cook & Co Ltd (16 September 1999) HC CHCH CP53/99. 
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they attempt to ensure shareholders35 are informed of relevant matters through assorted "disclosure" 
requirements.36 Disclosure further promotes accountability by ensuring that shareholders can make 
informed decisions,37 and by encouraging good directorial decision making38 and business 
disciplines.39 Finally, the regulatory requirements create a basis for liability.40 
The problem with this is, of course, that such requirements are a total nonsense for closely-held 
companies. There is no accountability of directors to shareholders where the directors are also the 
shareholders. Making good any wrongs suffered would amount to no more than a "money-go-
round." Similarly, disclosure of information already known would be a "paper-go-round" of records 
given and received by, and for the nominal benefit of, the same set of people. Even the good 
decision making and business discipline rationales are undermined by the practicalities of the 
reporting requirements, particularly the significant delay in preparation.41 Even if a director were to 
breach one of the requirements of the Companies Act, a shareholder-plaintiff is hardly likely to take 
action against him/herself as director-defendant.42  
Moreover, there is no need for such accountability. Directors do not need to be provided with an 
incentive to act in the best interests of the shareholders. Self-interest and synonymity will take care 
  
35  The Law Commission identified shareholders as the primary audience for disclosure by companies and 
directors – see Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 192, 494 and 610-623. See also 
Hale v Registrar of Companies, above n 19, para 25 Potter J. 
36  "Disclosure" includes the assorted record-keeping, certification and notice requirements – see, for example 
Companies Act 1993, ss 41-81, 129, 140, 160, 189, 194, 208, 209 and 211 and Third Schedule, clause 6, 
and Financial Reporting Act 1993, ss 10-14. 
37  See Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 198-199. 
38  For example, through the theory that "good processes are more likely to lead to good decisions" – see 
Goddard "Company Law Reforms – Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", above n 19, 155-156; 
England and Wales Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission Company Directors: Regulating 
Conflicts of Interests and Formulating a Statement of Duties (LAW COM No 261; SCOT LAW COM No 
173, London, 1999) www.lawcom.gov.uk (accessed 20 July 2006) paras 4.53-4.61; Simon Deakin and Alan 
Hughes Directors' Duties: Empirical Findings (Report to the England and Wales Law Commission and the 
Scottish Law Commission, ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, 1999) Table 17; 
and Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 494, 520-522 and clause 107. 
39  See, for example, Law Commission Company Law Report, ibid, para 601 and clause 156; Mason v Lewis, 
above n 17, paras 85-87 Judgment of the Court; and Hale v Registrar of Companies, above n 19, para 25 
Potter J. 
40  See Companies Act 1993, Part IX. 
41  See Financial Reporting Act 1993, in particular, section 10(2). 
42  See also R Dugan "Closely Held Companies under the Draft Companies Act" (1990) 20 VUWLR 161, 172-
173. 
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of that.43 The regulatory requirements imposed by the Companies Act are therefore inappropriate 
for closely-held companies. 
B Costs of the Requirements 
The regulatory requirements of the Companies Act have potentially-significant compliance 
costs. The technical nature of company law means that closely-held companies and/or their directors 
are likely to expend significant costs determining their exact legal obligations.44 If they choose to 
do it themselves,45 this will take the form of time and effort reading the Act or textbooks. 
Alternatively, it may take the form of the cost of professional advice. 
 
There are no reliable quantitative assessments of the level of compliance costs. A recent survey 
does, however, provide some guidance in this area.46 Businesses were asked to rank their 
compliance cost "priorities". The joint requirements of the Companies Act, Takeovers Act 1993 and 
Securities Act 1978 were ranked the seventh top "priority".47 The Companies Act aspect of this is 
most significant, given that virtually no small businesses have to comply with the Takeovers Act48 
or Securities Act.49 
In addition to costs, regulatory requirements also carry the potential for liability "traps". There 
does not appear to be any particular incentive for directors of closely-held companies to comply 
with the assorted regulatory requirements. There is neither any benefit, nor any particular likelihood 
of shareholder enforcement.50 In fact, many directors of closely-held companies may not even be 
 
43  See above, Part II A 11 Synonymity. 
44  The Law Commission proposed a "codified" reference point of directors' disclosure obligations – see Law 
Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, clause 179. This clause did not find its way into the 
Companies Act 1993. As to accessibility of statute law, see also Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer, President, 
Law Commission "Law Reform and the Law Commission after 20 Years – We Need to Try a Little Harder" 
(Address to the New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Victoria University of Wellington, 30 March 2006) 
Speech Notes, paras 34 and following. 
45  As is apparently the case for most smaller businesses – see above, Part 2 Informality. 
46  Business New Zealand and KPMG Summary Report of the Business New Zealand-KPMG Compliance Cost 
Survey, above n 20. 
47  That is, these Acts impose the seventh highest compliance costs for business – see ibid, 5 and 7 and 
Summary Tables and Graphs, Table 14.  
48  The Takeovers Act 1993 only applies to listed and formerly-listed companies, and companies with 50 or 
more shareholders – see Takeovers Act 1993, s 2 definition of "specified company" and Takeovers Code, 
clause 3 definition of "code company". 
49  The Securities Act 1978 only applies to issuers of securities to the public – see Securities Act 1978, s 3 and 
Part 2. While closely-held companies could issue securities to the public (particularly debt and participatory 
securities), the majority of closely-held companies very probably do not. 
50  See above, Part III A Regulatory Requirements. 
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aware of the assorted requirements.51 There are, however, a number of liability "traps" that may 
cause significant difficulties for unwary directors of closely-held companies.  
In terms of civil actions, if a company were to go into liquidation, its directors may find 
themselves pursued by the liquidator of the company for any failure to comply with the regulatory 
requirements.52 Directors may also be required to make a contribution to the company if they have 
been guilty of negligence or default in complying with the Companies Act requirements, 
particularly the accounting requirements.53 Finally, state-enforced criminal sanctions may also be 
imposed for failure to comply with assorted requirements,54 although prosecutorial discretion would 
probably mean that breaches of the law that do not cause any harm would not be prosecuted. 
It should be re-emphasised, however, that the Companies Act regulatory requirements do not 
appear to have any significant benefit in the case of closely-held companies. No matter how small 
the costs, they will never be justifiable on a cost-benefit analysis if the benefit is zero. This paper 
therefore argues that the requirements are an unjustified burden on closely-held companies. 
C Concessions to Closely-Held Companies 
The inappropriateness of certain regulatory requirements in the case of closely-held 
companies55 was recognised by the Law Commission. As a result of the "excessive formalities on 
the day-to-day operation of small (and, in particular, one-shareholder) companies",56 the Law 
Commission proposed introducing a new section to the then-Companies Bill that would permit 
  
51  See, in particular, Small Business Advisory Group Small and Medium Businesses in New Zealand: Report 
of the Small Business Advisory Group 2004, above n 5, 3-4, and above, Part 2 Informality. See also, 
for example, Mason v Lewis, above n 17, para 58 Judgment of the Court. 
52  See Companies Act 1993, s 161 and, for example, McCullagh v Gellert, above n 24; Crichton v Amaru 
(2001) 9 NZCLC 262,549 (HC); Kiwibilt Engineering Ltd (In Liquidation) v Pavlovich [2004] DCR 193; 
and Macfarlane v Barlow (1997) 8 NZCLC 261,470 (HC) (note, however, that this latter case was brought 
by a minority shareholder not involved in management of the company, rather than a liquidator. The 
company does therefore not satisfy this paper's definition of "closely-held"). 
53  Companies Act 1993, ss 300 and 301. See, for example, Mason v Lewis, above n 17; Re Cellar House Ltd 
(In Liquidation), above n 21; and Re Hilltop Group Ltd (In Liquidation) (alt cit Lawrence v Jacobsen) 
(2001) 9 NZCLC 262,477 (HC). 
54  For the list of criminal sanctions in the Companies Act (including penalties), see Companies Act 1993, ss 
373-374. 
55  While such measures are not necessarily limited to any particular sort of company, the practicalities of 
seeking – and obtaining – unanimous shareholder agreement mean that it is only likely to be used where the 
company is closely-held. Such opt-outs will presumably only occur where it is in the interests of 
shareholders to do so. 
56  New Zealand Law Commission Company Law: Transition and Revision (NZLC R16, Wellington, 1990) 
para 45. 
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shareholders to effectively opt-out of these formalities.57 In the Law Commission's view, 
shareholders should be entitled to waive matters for their benefit if they so desire.58 The Companies 
Act was eventually enacted with such opt-out provisions.59 There are, however, problems with 
these concessions as enacted. The net result of these issues is to undermine much of the greater 
flexibility anticipated by the Law Commission.60  
 
Putting aside the obvious additional compliance burdens associated with an opt-out rather than 
opt-in mechanism, the first issue is that not all regulatory requirements are subject to shareholder 
opt-out. The majority of the disclosure requirements, for example, fall into this category.61 Closely-
held companies must therefore comply with these regulatory requirements, even though they are a 
"paper-go-round" without benefit. 
Second, even where shareholders are able to opt-out, different sections require different 
procedural formalities in order to opt-out.62 There is no common, simple framework for closely-
held companies to address these assorted matters. This has resulted in a confusing array of differing 
provisions that closely-held companies must carefully consider, with ensuing compliance costs. One 
matter in this regard that may particularly frustrate shareholders is the inability to opt-out of some 
matters permanently, either by incorporating a permanent opt-out in the company's constitution or 
 
57  New Zealand Law Commission Company Law: Transition and Revision, above n 56, para 45 and clause 
78A. These comments were made in the Law Commission's follow-up report on company law following 
criticisms made of the initial report's rather limited concessions to closely-held companies. As to the 
criticism made of the initial draft, see New Zealand Law Commission Company Law Reform – 
Supplementary Paper No 2 – Closely Held Companies – Unanimous Shareholder Agreements (31 January 
1990) paras 4-5 (Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to the Regulatory and Competition 
Policy Branch, Ministry of Economic Development) and R Dugan "Closely Held Companies under the 
Draft Companies Act", above n 42.  
58  This is similar in concept to the doctrine of shareholder ratification – see Companies Act 1993, s 177. Note, 
however, the potential limitation in subs 177(3) – see also Morrison's Company Law (NZ) (Service 82, 
LexisNexis NZ, Wellington) paras 25.42-25.44 (updated July 2006) www.lexisnexis.co.nz (accessed 11 
August 2006). 
59  See, for example, Companies Act 1993, ss 107(1)-107(3), 196(2) and 211(3). 
60  The Companies Act 1993 as enacted departs from the report of the Law Commission in a number of 
respects – see Goddard "Company Law Reforms – Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", above n 19, 
156; Jenni McManus "Law Commission v Justice Department – Squabbling Officials Stall Company Law 
Reform" (25 October 1990) The Examiner New Zealand 5; and Bob Dey "Company Law – the Slow Job of 
Reform" (28 October 1990) The Dominion Wellington 23. 
61  See above, Part III A Regulatory Requirements, in particular, nn 36-39. 
62  For example, s 107 requires the opt-out agreement to be in writing. This is not apparently required for, for 
example, the agreement that certain matters not be included in the annual report – compare Companies Act 
1993, s 107(4) with s 211(3). 
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by passing "standing" unanimous resolutions.63 This compounds the problems of complying with 
the procedural formalities, as it is not possible for shareholders to turn their minds to the matter once 
and resolve it permanently.64 
Finally, some of the procedural formalities of the Companies Act to effect an opt-out are 
problematic themselves. It is not clear what purpose these procedural formalities are intended to 
serve. The initial regulatory requirements which shareholders are seeking to opt-out of are to protect 
the interests of shareholders. Where shareholders seek to opt-out of regulatory requirements, 
however, there are no obvious candidates to be the "recipients"65 of the "benefits" of the procedural 
requirements. Shareholders are "disclosing" matters to themselves. As for the initial regulatory 
requirements, the result is a "paper-go-round". 
IV PROPOSALS FOR REFORM: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
The previous section of this paper outlined the issues arising from the Companies Act that affect 
closely-held companies. Given the prevalence of closely-held companies in New Zealand, this paper 
considers that the issues raised above are matters that should be addressed. This paper recommends 
adopting a new statute allowing businesses to register as closely-held companies. The requirements 
of such a statute would be tailored towards the specific needs of the up to 95 per cent of companies 
in New Zealand that are closely-held. This section of the paper considers some of the general 
principles that may inform the design of such a statute; the next section considers some specific 
features of the proposed statute. 
A The Need for Specific Legislation 
The first point to be made is the need for specific legislation. The Law Commission 
recommended that a single company law statute be adopted. The Commission considered that an 
appropriately-drafted statute could provide sufficient flexibility for every sort of company.66  
This paper disagrees with the proposition that company law is infinitely "scale-able" in this 
fashion. This paper considers that the needs of widely- and closely-held companies are 
  
63  For example, it is possible to opt-out "generally" from the requirements of s 107 until further notice, but the 
resolution not to appoint an auditor must be re-executed each year – compare Companies Act 1993, ss 
107(5)(b) and 107(6) with Companies Act 1993 s 196(2). 
64  See also Goddard "Company Law Reforms – Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", above n 19, 156-
158. 
65  For example, Companies Act 1993, s 107(4) requires shareholder agreements under s 107 to be in writing. It 
is not necessary to give anyone a copy of this written agreement, however. 
66  Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 16-18, 66-72, 232-241 and 293-294 and New 
Zealand Law Commission Company Law Reform – Supplementary Paper No 2 – Closely Held Companies – 
Unanimous Shareholder Agreements, above n 57, para 3(a). 
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fundamentally different. In short, widely-held companies require mechanisms to ensure the directors 
are accountable to shareholders; closely-held companies do not. 
While the Companies Act adequately caters for the needs of widely-held companies,67 it does 
not adequately address the situation faced by closely-held companies. Specific legislation that caters 
for the needs of closely-held companies is the best solution.68 Such new legislation would be in 
addition to the Companies Act. This paper does not advocate the repeal and replacement of the 
Companies Act, as it caters for the needs of widely-held companies. 
B Comparative Precedent 
There is a significant amount of comparative precedent to consider in formulating a new 
closely-held companies statute. Internationally, a number of jurisdictions have implemented statutes 
specifically designed for closely-held/private companies.69 Most relevant for New Zealand are the 
examples of the United States and South Africa. In the United States, the "limited liability 
company" is the fastest-growing business form in the United States.70 This popularity is due to a 
combination of flexibility, limited liability and favourable tax treatment.71 The broadly-comparable 
South African Close Corporations Act72 has met with similar success.73 These approaches have 
been described as a "hybrid" of company and partnership law.74 This "incorporated partnership" 
  
67  Aspects of the Companies Act 1993 may be criticised even for widely-held companies. This is beyond the 
scope of this paper, however. 
68  See, for example, Johan Henning "The Company Law Reform Bill, Small Businesses and Private 
Companies" (2006) 27 Comp Law 97, 97 and Goddard "Company Law Reforms – Lessons from the New 
Zealand Experience", above n 19, 163. 
69  Particularly civil jurisdictions. The German Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung or "GmbH" is often 
attributed the status of the "first" private companies statute. As to the actual comparability of United States-
style limited liability companies with the German GmbH, see Dominik Kallweit The US Limited Liability 
Company: A Role Model for German Company Law (LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 2003). 
70  See, for example, Jeffrey K Vandervoort "Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Companies: The Need for a 
Better Standard" (2004) 3 DePaul Bus & Com LJ 51, 63. As to limited liability companies generally, see 
Kallweit, ibid, 4-6 and Fallany O Stover and Susan Pace Hamill "The LLC versus LLP Conundrum: Advice 
for Businesses Contemplating the Choice" (1999) 50 Ala L Rev 813, 813-821. 
71  Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), above n 3, prefatory note, 1. 
72  Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA). 
73  See Rehana Cassim and Femida Cassim "The Reform of Corporate Law in South Africa" (2005) 16 ICCLR 
411, 413. In particular, the article cites the fact that South Africa has approximately 880,000 actively 
registered close corporations, but only 300,000 private companies and 6,000 public companies.  
74  Vandervoort "Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Companies: The Need for a Better Standard", above n 
70, 51. 
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model has been put forward by a number of commentators recommending changes to company law 
in jurisdictions without such statutes.75 
The United States and South African statutes have been successful in practice; New Zealand 
should carefully consider whether there are any compelling reasons for departing from proven 
success.76 This paper's proposals proceed on this basis. While the overall framework and some 
specific features are worth emulating, however, there are a number of changes that could usefully be 
made to this international precedent, particularly with the goal of simplification in mind.77 For 
example, the United States model is carefully structured so as to provide sufficient options to enable 
limited liability companies to take advantage of the particular tax situation in the United States.78 
This would not be necessary in New Zealand, and so some of this complexity could be removed. 
This paper also considers other options for simplification. 
From a domestic perspective it is worthwhile considering the provisions of partnership law.79 
Partnerships are effectively closely-held businesses where the partners have both equity stakes80 
and management rights81 in the business. Partnerships provide significant advantages in terms of 
flexibility,82 although do lack some of the features of company law, most notably, limited liability. 
It is also important to consider the precedent of the existing Companies Act. Consistency with 
the existing law where possible would be advantageous: precedent and knowledge of existing 
concepts will make the new statute more readily understandable. Perhaps more importantly, the 
statute should not impose substantially more onerous obligations than the existing Companies Act. 
Otherwise, businesses would simply incorporate under the existing statute rather than the new 
closely-held companies statute.  
  
75  See, for example, Andrew Hicks "Reforming the Law of Private Companies" (1995) 16 Comp Law 171, 
176-177, Henning "The Company Law Reform Bill, Small Businesses and Private Companies", above n 68, 
97, and Goddard "Company Law Reforms – Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", above n 19, 163.  
76  Goddard "Company Law Reforms – Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", ibid, 165-166. 
77  Ibid, 165-166. 
78  Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), above n 3, prefatory note, 1, and Stover and Pace Hamill 
"The LLC versus LLP Conundrum: Advice for Businesses Contemplating the Choice", above n 70, 815 and 
footnote 8. 
79  See Partnerships Act 1908. 
80  See Partnerships Act 1908, in particular s 27(a). 
81  See Partnerships Act 1908, in particular s 27(e). 
82  See Partnerships Act 1908, s 22. 
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C Form of the New Legislation  
This paper further recommends that this new legislation be self-contained so far as possible. As 
discussed above, many closely-held companies operate informally and without professional 
advice.83 It is therefore necessary to state the law clearly and concisely to make it as accessible as 
possible to closely-held companies.84  
This paper does not consider that the current approach of the Companies Act (allowing closely-
held companies to opt-out of particular provisions) is appropriate. Even if the assorted 
inconsistencies could be and were addressed,85 such an approach is not as accessible as a self-
contained statute.86 Currently, the entire statute must be considered and the applicable provisions 
determined by reference to the dis-applying section. An understanding of what one is opting out of 
is necessary. Further, there are many irrelevant provisions. Finally, additional procedural 
requirements are necessary to effect an opt-out.87 This paper therefore considers that accessibility 
would be better achieved either by means of a separate, stand-alone statute, or by adding a self-
contained part to the Companies Act.  
D Flexibility 
The new closely-held companies statute should also provide sufficient flexibility to enable 
principals to conduct their own affairs as they desire.88 Excessive flexibility may, however, 
compromise the accessibility of the statute.89 The statute should therefore provide suitable "default" 
provisions that would apply unless the principals otherwise agree.90 This would provide guidance 
and accessibility for basic closely-held companies and their principals, while ensuring flexibility for 
specific purposes or more-advanced closely-held companies. Similarly, for certain requirements, it 
may be appropriate to provide general flexibility, but also to set out "safe-harbour" provisions. Safe-
  
83  See above, Part II B 2 Informality. 
84  See Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 121-126 and Palmer "Law Reform and the 
Law Commission after 20 Years – We Need to Try a Little Harder", above n 44, paras 34 and following. 
85  See above, Part III C Concessions to Closely-Held Companies. 
86  See also, for example, the comparative table of numbers of sections and pages in selected companies 
statutes in Goddard "Company Law Reforms – Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", above n 19, 
164. 
87  See also the Companies Bill 2005, no 190 (UK), and Henning "The Company Law Reform Bill, Small 
Businesses and Private Companies" above n 68, 97. 
88  See Goddard "Company Law Reforms – Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", above n 19, 162. 
89  See, for example, Partnerships Act 1908 and its failure to provide a "standard form" partnership agreement. 
90  Goddard "Company Law Reforms – Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", above n 19, 167. 
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harbour provisions are useful, as flexible legislation is necessarily drafted with a degree of 
generality. Safe-harbour provisions provide certainty that the law has been satisfied. 
V PROPOSALS FOR REFORM: SPECIFIC FEATURES 
This section of the paper builds on the general principles considered in the previous section and 
recommends specific features of the new statute. In the tradition of the Law Commission's proposals 
for company law reform,91 the paper also sets out possible draft clauses for the new statute.92 
The intent of this section is to set out the most important provisions of the new statute. It does 
not consider some of the detailed technical elements that would be necessary for the statute, for 
example, name93 and registration requirements,94 service of legal proceedings95 and the standard of 
knowledge required to impugn transactions.96 Finally, and perhaps critical to the success of the 
closely-held companies statute, the paper has not considered matters relating to taxation. These 
matters have not been able to be included within the scope of this paper.  
A No "Directors" and "Shareholders" 
The essential feature of a closely-held company is that its shareholders are also its directors. 
Recognising this fact would be the single most important element of the new statute. Most 
importantly, such an approach would clearly obviate the need to impose any regulatory 
requirements on "directors" to ensure accountability to "shareholders". 
Rather than having "directors" and "shareholders", this paper instead proposes that the new 
statute refer to "principals" of closely-held companies. This encompasses the notion that principals 
both own and run closely-held companies. This approach is utilised in the United States97 and South 
  
91  Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 5-7.  
92  The draft clauses are inserted as appropriate throughout the paper. 
93  See, for example, Companies Act 1993, s 25; Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 22; Wyoming Limited 
Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-105(a) (1977) and Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(1996), s 105(a). 
94  See, for example, Companies Act 1993, ss 13-14, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), ss 12-13, Wyoming 
Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat §§ 17-15-106 and 17-15-108 (1977), and Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act (1996), above n 3, ss 206 and 208. 
95  See, for example, Companies Act 1993, s 387 and Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 25. 
96  See, for example, Companies Act 1993, s 19; Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 17 and Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act (1996), above n 3, s 102. 
97  See, for example, the Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat §§ 17-15-106, 17-15-107, and 
17-15-113 - 17-15-116 (1977) and the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), above n 3, Article 4. 
Note, however, that these statutes also provide the option for Limited Liability Companies to have 
"managers" if they chose to do so (see Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-116 
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Africa,98 both of which refer to "members" to encompass this concept. This paper uses "principals" 
to denote this member/shareholder/director concept. 
B Definition and Eligibility 
The prospect of distinguishing a closely-held company from an ordinary company caused the 
Law Commission some concern.99 This paper proposes, however, that the new closely-held 
companies statute be in addition to the Companies Act. Under this paper's approach, there is no need 
have a "bright-line" test to distinguish between the two sorts of companies. Whether to incorporate 
under the Companies Act or under the new closely-held companies statute would simply be a 
decision of the individual(s) concerned. 
There does, however, need to be some eligibility criteria for closely-held companies. The 
proposed closely-held companies statute has been designed on the basis that all principals of a 
closely-held company would be involved in its management. This is not practicable where there are 
too many principals.100 South Africa has a limit of ten principals;101 this paper proposes the same 
number. It is acknowledged, however, that this is something of an arbitrary figure. In any event, 
however, the vast majority of businesses wishing to utilise a closely-held company structure will fall 
below this threshold.102  
This paper also proposes that only natural persons be able to be principals. The same approach is 
adopted in South Africa.103 The intent of the statute is to address the issues associated with the 
Companies Act for closely-held companies. The needs of, and appropriate requirements for, 
subsidiaries of other companies are different to those of small owner-operated businesses. Such 
needs and requirements are outside the scope of this paper. A particular concern is the fact that 
principals exercise management power directly; another company is not able to do this under current 
  
(1977), and Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), s 404). This flexibility is primarily due to the 
United States tax provisions – see Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), prefatory note, 1. 
98  See Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 1(1), definition of "member" and Part IV. 
99  New Zealand Law Commission Company Law Reform – Supplementary Paper No 2 – Closely Held 
Companies – Unanimous Shareholder Agreements, above n 57, para 3(b). 
100  See also above, Part II A Number of Closely-Held Companies, in particular n 12. 
101  Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), ss 2(1) and 28.  
102  See above, Part II A Number of Closely-Held Companies. 
103  See Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 29. 
 A CLOSELY-HELD COMPANIES ACT FOR NEW ZEALAND 559 
New Zealand law.104 It is also worth noting that other legal avenues are available for matters such 
as venture capital investment.105 The new statute may therefore provide, for example: 
Draft Clause: Eligibility for Membership of a Closely-Held Company 
A Closely-Held Company must have at least one, but not more than ten, Principals, all of whom must be 
natural persons. 
C Creditors, Limited Liability and Regulatory Requirements 
This paper criticises the regulatory requirements of the Companies Act in respect of 
shareholders of closely-held companies. The situation is quite different, however, for creditors and 
other contractual third-parties (collectively, "creditors").  
Unlike director/shareholder interests, there is no synonymity of interests with creditors in the 
case of a closely-held company.106 Self-interest cannot be relied upon to prevent abuse. Limited 
liability means that creditors may not be able to practically recover against a debtor-company due to 
its impecuniosity, even where the company is clearly liable to the creditor. It is therefore necessary 
to impose some form of regulatory requirement to prevent abuse of the corporate form to the 
detriment of creditors. The costs of such requirements will be justified, so long as greater benefit 
flows to creditors.  
There are a number of possible alternatives for such regulatory requirements. This section 
considers and rejects both the possibilities of removing limited liability, and imposing minimum 
capital requirements. Rather, the paper proposes imposing duties for the benefit of creditors. It also 
considers the form and standard of such duties, as well as some practical considerations. 
1 No limited liability 
Limited liability is typically considered as a key feature of company law. It encourages 
entrepreneurship and taking business risks without fear of recourse to the other assets of the 
shareholders.107 It is not, however, universally acclaimed. Objections have been raised both as a 
  
104  The Companies Act 1993 requires directors to be natural persons – see Companies Act 1993, s 151(1). 
105  Limited partnerships in particular are the preferred vehicle for the venture capital industry. New Zealand's 
limited partnership regime is currently under review – see Ministry of Economic Development A Limited 
Partnership Regime for New Zealand (Ministry of Economic Development, Wellington, 2005) 
www.med.govt.nz (accessed 18 August 2006) in particular para 5. There does not seem to be any reason 
why a closely-held company could not be the general partner in a limited partnership. This would allow 
equity investment in the business venture operated by the closely-held company while avoiding the 
difficulties described in this paragraph. 
106  Although it is possible for the principal of a company/closely-held company to lend the company money. 
The principal would be the creditor of his/her own company.  
107  See, for example, Companies Act 1993, long title, para (a); Rainham Chemical Works Ltd v Belvedere Fish 
Guano Co Ltd [1921] 2 AC 465, 475 (HL) Lord Buckmaster; New Zealand Law Commission Company 
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matter of principle108 and practice.109 At least one commentator has proposed a closely-held 
business statute without limited liability.110 The essential rationales for this are that the majority of 
closely-held businesses do not want or need limited liability,111 and may abuse limited liability.112 
Removing limited liability would also remove the potential for abuse of the company form. There 
would therefore be no need to impose regulatory requirements to counter this potential for abuse. 
The argument is that closely-held businesses would get greater benefits from the removal of limited 
liability than its retention.113 
This ignores, however, the fact that it is possible to limit liability in other ways. It will, of 
course, be possible to limit liability by incorporating a company under the Companies Act rather 
than a closely-held company. It is also possible to limit liability contractually by including express 
terms to that effect with third parties.114 Contractual limitation or disclaimer of liability may even 
include some claims sounding in tort.115 It is also possible to implement a form of asset protection 
through family trusts116 and property relationship agreements.117 Moreover, regardless of one's 
normative views as to the appropriateness of limited liability, it must be accepted that limited 
liability is now a feature of the commercial environment. Limited liability does not appear to have 
  
Law: A Discussion Paper (NZLC PP5, Wellington, 1987) paras 33 and 41 and Law Commission Company 
Law Report, above n 1, para 22(d). 
108  See, for example, John Farrar "Frankenstein Incorporated or Fools' Parliament? Revisting the Concept of 
Corporation in Corporate Governance" in A Borrowdale, D Rowe and L Taylor (eds) Company Law 
Writings: A New Zealand Collection, above n 8, 59.  
109  Andrew Hicks "Reforming the Law of Private Companies", above n 75, in particular 174 and following.  
110  Ibid, in particular 176-177. The author also identifies some existing problems with partnership law that 
should be addressed – see 175-176. 
111  Ibid, 175-176. 
112  Ibid, 174-175. 
113  Ibid, 176-177. 
114  As to the "standard form contract" model for company law, see, for example, New Zealand Law 
Commission Company Law: A Discussion Paper, above n 107, para 36, and Goddard "Company Law 
Reforms – Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", above n 19, 146. One intriguing possibility flowing 
from this standard form contract model is the prospect of providing for a Closely-Held Companies "Act" not 
as an Act of Parliament, but rather through common adoption of contractual terms – for example, making 
the "Act" publicly available, and allowing those that wish to "incorporate" under it to reference the terms of 
the "Act" contractually. 
115  See, for example, Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 (HL).  
116  See, for example, Official Assignee v Wilson [2006] 2 NZLR 841 (HC). 
117  See, for example, Felton v Johnson [2006] NZSC 31 (SC). Asset protection is not the same as limited 
liability, however; personal bankruptcy is a necessary precursor for asset protection to be necessary. 
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been seriously challenged in any major review of company law.118 South Africa119 and the United 
States120 both provide for limited liability for their closely-held companies. Finally, rejecting 
limited liability would be open to criticism on the basis that a nominally-enabling and facilitative 
statute does not adequately cater for the New Zealand business environment.121  
Realistically, if a new closely-held companies statute were adopted without limited liability, 
parties that desire limited liability will either adopt contractual terms or incorporate under the 
Companies Act. The former will result in transactional inefficiency, while the latter will simply 
render the new statute redundant. It therefore seems appropriate that the new closely-held 
companies statute make provision for limitation of liability:122 
Draft Clause: Limited Liability 
The Principal(s) of a Closely-Held Company are not liable for the debts of the Closely-Held Company.  
2 Minimum capital requirements 
Maintaining limited liability means that it is necessary to resort to other avenues to ensure the 
corporate form does not lead to abuse of creditors. Minimum capital requirements are a traditional 
feature of company law.123 Such requirements theoretically prevent the formation of, or trading by, 
companies that run the risk of failure due to undercapitalisation.  
Such requirements have significant problems, however, and were abolished in New Zealand in 
the current Companies Act. This paper considers that problems identified by the Law Commission 
with such requirements are compelling, and minimum capital requirements should not be 
introduced.124 Even if the Law Commission's reasons were not so compelling, the likely imposition 
of minimum capital requirements could not be required in isolation only for closely-held companies. 
Businesses would again simply chose to incorporate under the Companies Act instead. This paper 
  
118  See, for example, Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1; the Department of Trade and 
Industry Better Business Framework: Companies Bill (Department of Trade and Industry, London, 2006) 
www.dti.gov.uk (accessed 6 September 2006). 
119  Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 2(3). 
120  See, for example, Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-113 (1977) and Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act (1996), above n 3, ss 201 and 303. 
121  This is the same criticism levelled at the Companies Act 1993 by this paper. 
122  See, for example, Companies Act 1993, s 15; Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 2(3); Wyoming Limited 
Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-113 (1977) and Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), 
above n 3, ss 201 and 303. 
123  For example, stated and par value shares. This does not include the solvency test. 
124  See Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 84 and 223-228. 
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therefore does not consider such proposals would be appropriate for a new closely-held companies 
statute for New Zealand. 
3 Duties to creditors 
The final possibility for creditor protection is imposing directors' duties in favour of creditors. 
This is the approach of the current Companies Act, which imposes a number of different duties in 
favour of creditors. 125 First, the Companies Act imposes a duty on directors not to trade 
"recklessly" – that is, a director must not agree, cause or allow the business of a company to be 
carried on in a manner "likely to create a substantial risk of serious loss to the company's 
creditors".126 Second, there is a duty not to enter into obligations that cannot be performed.127 
Third, there is a duty to keep accounting records.128 Fourth, in specific relation to payments to 
principals, there are two further different duties/tests – payments to a principal as a director must 
effectively be reasonable,129 while payments to a principal as a shareholder must satisfy the 
solvency test.130 Finally, the Companies Act includes something of a catch-all duty on directors 
(and certain others) not to act negligently or otherwise breach any duty or trust.131 Related to this 
catch-all duty, there is also a common law duty to creditors not to cause loss, at the least in the case 
of insolvency or potential insolvency of a company.132  
The United States and South Africa similarly impose duties on principals of closely-held 
companies in favour of creditors. The United States approach varies between jurisdictions. The 
more robust view as to limitation of liability only holds a principal liable in a limited range of 
  
125  Note that some duties are owed to the company, and some are owed to creditors directly. This is considered 
below – see below, Part V C 4 Balancing mechanisms versus direct regulatory requirements. 
126  Companies Act 1993, s 135. 
127  Companies Act 1993, s 136. 
128  Companies Act 1993, ss 194 and 300. 
129  Companies Act 1993, ss 161(4) and 161(5). 
130  Companies Act 1993, ss 4, 52, 53, 107 and 108. As to directors' liability, see Companies Act 1993, s 52(2), 
56(2) and 108(2), as well as s 134. Note that the recipient of the payment may also be liable for any 
distributions received that the recipient knew were in contravention of the solvency test (see Companies Act 
1993, ss 56(1) and 108(4)). For a closely-held company, such differentiation of liability is not particularly 
useful.  
131  Companies Act 1993, s 301. Note that this is phrased as a discretionary remedy, rather than a duty. 
132  Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd [1985] 1 NZLR 242, 249-250 (CA) Cooke J. See also West Mercia 
Safetywear Ltd (in liq) v Dodd [1988] BCLC 250; [1988] BCC 30 (EWCA); Morrison's Company Law 
(NZ), above n 58, paras 24.8, Sealy "Directors' 'Wider' Responsibilities – Problems Conceptual, Practical 
and Procedural", above n 31, 178-179; Francis Dawson "Acting in the Best Interests of the Company – For 
Whom are Directors 'Trustees'?" (1984) 11 NZULR 68, 68-70 and Cooney Report, above n 31, paras 5.1 
and following. 
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circumstances: a principal is liable for company property and money;133 for capital he/she has 
agreed to, but has not yet, contributed;134 and for distributions received in breach of the solvency 
test.135 The slightly less robust view adopts generally the same approach,136 but with the addition 
of a general duty not to engage in knowing violations of the law, intentional misconduct, reckless 
conduct, or grossly negligent conduct.137 That is, a principal has a general duty of care to the 
standard of gross negligence not to cause loss. It is, however, important to note that this apparently 
robust approach is countered by the well-established United States "piercing the corporate veil" 
doctrine. Under this doctrine, it is possible to set aside limited liability protections in a range of 
circumstances, including fraud, undercapitalisation, the "alter ego" doctrine, and, in some 
circumstances, failure to observe the formalities of the corporate form.138 
The South African approach is again broadly similar. Principals are liable for promised 
contributions139 and distributions made in breach of the solvency test.140 Like the less robust 
approach in the United States, South Africa also has general duty of care provisions. Unlike the 
United States, South Africa's statute provides for two standards of care: both ordinary negligence141 
  
133  See, for example, Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-121(b) (1977). 
134  See, for example, Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-121(a) (1977). 
135  See, for example, Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat §§ 17-15-119 and 17-15-120 (1977). 
The solvency test used in the Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act is a simple test of assets exceeding 
liabilities – see Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-119 (1977). 
136  See, for example, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), above n 3, ss 409(b)(1), 402 and 406-
407. The solvency test used in the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act is a two-stage test of assets 
exceeding liabilities and ability to pay debts in the ordinary course of business – see s 406(a). 
137  See, for example, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), ibid, s 409(c). See also s 303, comment. 
138  See generally, Vandervoort "Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Companies: The Need for a Better 
Standard", above n 70, 58-63. Note that failure to observe formalities has generally been questioned as a 
factor (see 59-61), and in some cases, statutorily abolished – see, for example, Uniform Limited Liability 
Company Act (1996), ibid, s 303(b). 
139  Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), ss 24(5) and 63(b). 
140  Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 51. South African adopts a broader meaning of distribution (any 
payment to a principal by reason only of his/her status as principal – that is, excluding only contracts for 
services) and a three part solvency test (balance sheet, ability to pay debts as they become due, and whether 
in fact the distribution will mean debts will not be able to be paid – see Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 
51(1)). 
141  Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 43. 
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and gross negligence.142 Additionally, South Africa requires accounting records to be kept, 
although the direct penalty for breach is criminal, rather than civil.143 
 
The approaches of the United States and South Africa, although somewhat simpler than New 
Zealand, are still complicated. Much of this complexity is due to the fact that company law seldom 
imposes direct regulatory requirements. Rather, most regulatory requirements are owed to "the 
company" in a type of balancing mechanism. 
4 Balancing mechanisms versus direct regulatory requirements 
In a company (particularly a widely-held company), there may be a number of competing 
interest groups, including directors, shareholders and creditors, and potentially subgroups of 
shareholders and creditors ("stakeholders"). There may be tensions between the interests of such 
stakeholders – for example, a shareholder's interest in the company maximising its dividends may be 
opposed to creditor's interests in the company maintaining sufficient assets to pay its debts.  
Company law therefore attempts to provide a mechanism to resolve the competing interests of 
the assorted stakeholders in a company. Rather than owing separate and potentially conflicting 
duties to ensure the various groups of stakeholders' interests are maintained, the majority of 
directors' duties are instead owed to the company.144 The primary duty is to act in the best interests 
of the company.145 This mechanism effectively allows certain interests to trump other interests. So 
in the shareholder/creditor interests example above, it is in the interests of the company not to 
become insolvent, therefore it is not in the interests of the company to distribute all cash received to 
the shareholders as quickly as possible.  
Taking the example of a one-person closely-held company,146 however, it is clear that there are 
no competing interests to "balance". The only major group of stakeholders in a one-person closely-
held company would be its creditors. Following this reasoning to its conclusion, there is no need to 
impose on the principal a duty to creditors via "the company" at all. Instead, it would be possible to 
simply impose a direct duty on the principal of a one-person company in favour of creditors. This is 
 
142  Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 64. 
143  Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 56. 
144  See Companies Act 1993, s 169(3), and, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 43, and Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act (1996), above n 3, s 409(c). 
145  Companies Act 1993, s 131. See also Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 184-196 
and 504-509 and clause 101. 
146  Considering a one-person company also forces greater focus on the specific considerations of the corporate 
form, without the diversions associated with multiple shareholders. The position of multiple shareholders is 
considered below – see below, Part VI D Multi-Principal Closely-Held Companies. 
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similar to the current common law approach in New Zealand as expressed in Nicholson v 
Permakraft.147 
This would have the advantage of simplicity. The complexities and vagaries of the balancing 
exercise have been criticised.148 This approach would also avoid situations where wrongdoers 
indirectly benefit from actions taken against them.149 Further, it would obviate the need for more-
complicated enforcement mechanisms such as a derivative actions.150 Such mechanisms are 
arguably disadvantageous for shareholders,151 as they must effectively satisfy the court twice of the 
appropriateness of the action.152 This approach would also avoid the need for particular (and more 
complicated) provisions relating to shareholder ratification and the need to prevent after-the-event 
ratifications of actions to the detriment of creditors.153 
5 Standard of care 
This paper recommends imposing a duty of care on the principals of a closely-held company in 
respect of the company's creditors. The appropriate standard of care for that duty must be 
considered. Imposing liability too readily will discourage what may be justifiable business risks 
because of fear of individual liability; making it too difficult to hold delinquent principals liable will 
not uphold creditors' interests. 
There are a number of possibilities for such a standard. New Zealand,154 the United States155 
and South Africa156 all currently provide for a solvency test for some matters. This is effectively a 
  
147  Nicholson v Permakraft, above n 132. 
148  See, in particular, Sealy "Directors' 'Wider' Responsibilities – Problems Conceptual, Practical and 
Procedural", above n 31, 175. 
149  For example, the situation where a director has breached a duty to a company and the company successfully 
sues him/her for that breach. If, however, the director were also a shareholder in that company, he/she 
would indirectly benefit anyway due to the increase in value of his/her shares. 
150  See Companies Act 1993, Part IX, and in particulars ss 165 and 169. See also Law Commission Company 
Law Report, above n 1, para 318.  
151  Although there are costs advantages – see Companies Act 1993, s 166. 
152  Leave of the Court is required to bring a derivative action – see Companies Act 1993, s 165 and Vrij v Boyle 
[1995] 3 NZLR 763 (HC). See also Securities Markets Act 1988, s 18 and Colonial Mutual Life Assurance 
Society Ltd v Wilson Neill Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 152 (CA). 
153  See McCullagh v Gellert, above n 24; Morrison's Company Law (NZ), above n 58, paras 25.42-25.44; Close 
Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 43(2); Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-121(c) 
(1977) and Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), above n 3, s 103(b)(2)(ii). 
154  Companies Act 1993, s 4. 
155  For example, Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat §§ 17-15-119 and 17-15-120 (1977) and 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), ibid, ss 406-407. See also above, n 135 and n 136. 
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"strict" standard, in that it is either satisfied in the particular circumstances or it is not. Both the 
United States157 and South Africa158 use a gross negligence test for some matters; South Africa 
also uses ordinary negligence in some circumstances.159 New Zealand has an array of tests,160 the 
standard of which is not always clear.161  
Into this already-confusing mix must be added the common law "business judgment rule". This 
rule reflects the courts' traditional reluctance to become involved in matters of "business judgment" 
and to not second guess particular decisions of directors.162 It is effectively a presumption of non-
liability where the transaction is not self-interested, is undertaken on an informed basis, and is not 
irrational.163 A form of the business judgment rule is recognised in the Companies Act,164 although 
it does not appear to have been interpreted as such.165 
Out of this multitude, one common theme is perhaps that greater scrutiny needs to be paid to 
self-interested transactions. Other than this, it is difficult to determine any general trends or any 
  
156  Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), 51(1). See also above, n 140. 
157  For example, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), above n 3, s 490(c). See also above, n 137. 
158  Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 64. See also above, n 142. 
159  Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 43. See also above, n 141. 
160  See, for example, Companies Act 1993, ss 131-138 and 300-301, and Nicholson v Permakraft, above n 132. 
161  See, for example, Companies Act 1993, s 135. Notwithstanding the title of the section being "reckless" 
trading, the section itself refers to "likely to create a substantial risk of serious loss" (emphasis added). See 
also Re Global Print Strategies Ltd (In Liquidation) (alt cit Mason v Lewis) (25 November 2004) HC AK 
M459-IM03, para 38 Salmon J (note that while this case was reversed on appeal, the observations on s 135 
were not challenged – see Mason v Lewis, above n 17) and Fatupaito v Bates [2001] 3 NZLR 386; (2001) 9 
NZCLC 262,583, paras 60-67 (HC) O'Regan J. Goddard goes further and describes some of the duties 
(Companies Act 1993, ss 135 and 136) as "extraordinary" – see Goddard "Company Law Reforms – 
Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", above n 19, 159 and footnote 35. 
162  See, for example, Re City Equitable Fire Assurance Co [1925] Ch 407 (CA). 
163  See Corporations Act 2001 (Aus), s 180(2) and Aronson v Lewis (1984) 473 A 2d 805, 812 (Supreme Court 
of Delaware) Moore J for the Court. There are many articles relating to the business judgment rule – see, for 
example, L S Sealy "Reforming the Law on Directors' Duties" (1991) 12 Comp Law 175, 177; Len Sealy 
"Directors' Duties Revisited" (2001) 22 Comp Law 79, 79; David Tan "Delivering the Judgment on a 
Statutory Business Judgment Rule in Australia" 1995 AJCL LEXIS 39, in particular 4-12 and 17-24; 
Cooney Report, above n 31, paras 3.30-3.35; and England and Wales Law Commission and the Scottish 
Law Commission Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interests and Formulating a Statement of 
Duties, above n 38, paras 5.21-5.25. 
164  See Companies Act 1993, s 138, and Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 520-522 and 
clause 107. 
165  Compare, for example, the Court of Appeal judgment in Mason v Lewis, above n 17, in particular paras 77-
83 Judgment of the Court, with the High Court judgment in the same case (Re Global Print Strategies Ltd 
(In Liquidation), above n 161), in particular paras 41-42 and 67-68 Salmon J. 
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particular standard of international best practice. While it is clearly necessary to strike an adequate 
balance between protecting creditors' interests and not unduly fettering business discretion, there 
will always be some dispute about whether the correct balance has been stuck.  
6 Proposed duty of care 
With the factors considered in the previous sections in mind, as well as the general principle of 
flexibility,166 this paper proposes a general duty not to conduct the business of a closely-held 
company in such a way that causes loss to creditors. This duty would be imposed on principals 
directly in favour of creditors, without resort to "the company", as is outlined in Nicholson v 
Permakraft.167 That case phrased the duty as only arising in the event of insolvency, however.168 It 
seems that this could be approached more simply as a duty to refrain from prejudicing the interests 
of creditors generally. This is effectively a duty not to become insolvent. This paper therefore 
recommends that the new closely-held companies statute provide that: 
Draft Clause: Duties of Principals to Creditors  
(1) The Principal(s) of a Closely-Held Company must not conduct the business of the Closely-Held 
Company in such a way that causes loss to creditors of the Closely-Held Company.  
This clearly favours creditors too much. It is therefore necessary to introduce a range of 
exceptions/defences for principals. Broadly, this paper recommends that there should be two 
standards of care: one for non-interested transactions and one for self-interested transactions. Self-
interested transactions require much greater scrutiny and therefore a higher standard of care. This 
paper therefore recommends that the new statute provide: 
(2) A Principal that breaches the duty in subsection (1) is liable to creditor(s) that suffer loss due to 
the breach, unless: 
(a) The Principal, in causing the Closely-Held Company to undertake the actions that are 
alleged to have cause the breach:169 
(i) Did not have a personal interest in the actions, or the outcome of the actions;  
(ii) Acted in an informed manner; and 
(iii) Had a rational belief that the actions would not cause loss to creditors; or 
  
166  See above, Part IV D Flexibility. 
167  Nicholson v Permakraft, above n 132. 
168  Ibid, 249-250 Cooke J. 
169  See, for example, Corporations Act 2001 (Aus), s 180(2). 
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(b) The actions that are alleged to have caused the breach would have been undertaken by a 
reasonably prudent business person acting as a Principal of the Closely-Held Company. 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a)(iii), a belief is rational unless it is a belief such that no 
reasonable person in the position of the Principal could hold it.170 
This approach would utilise a version of the business judgment rule for non-interested 
transactions. So long as a principal is not interested in the transaction, and makes the decision on an 
informed and rational basis, it is not open to challenge. This should empower principals with 
sufficient security from liability to encourage business decisions.  
This paper proposes a reasonableness standard for self-interested transactions. This effectively 
extends the current New Zealand position for non-distribution payments to principals171 to all self-
interested transactions, including dividends. This is more flexible than the traditional solvency test. 
The use of a "reasonably prudent business person acting as a principal of the closely-held company" 
acknowledges that the nature of business undertaken by closely-held companies will vary from 
company to company.172 
The courts have traditionally been reluctant to interfere with business decisions or formulate a 
"reasonable businessman" standard of care.173 In practice, however, such a standard has been 
developing in relation to prohibitions of delinquent directors.174 There does not seem to be any 
reason why such a standard should not extend to liability as well as potential prohibition. 
Punishment through prohibition is likely to be of little comfort to out-of-pocket creditors. 
Reasonableness (in varying forms) is also used by South Africa and the United States.175 
Out of concern that reasonableness may be uncertain for some risk-averse principals, it may be 
appropriate to introduce a safe-harbour provision for self-interested transactions: 
  
170  See, for example, Corporations Act 2001 (Aus), s 180(2). This is akin to a public law/Wednesbury 
reasonableness test – see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 
223 (EWCA). 
171  Companies Act 1993, s 161. 
172  See also above, Part IV D Flexibility. 
173  See, for example, Re City Equitable Fire Assurance Co, above n 162. 
174  See Companies Act 1993, s 385, National Enforcement Unit Banned Directors and Managers / Director 
Prohibitions (Ministry of Economic Development, Wellington, 2006) www.enforcement.med.govt.nz 
(accessed 6 September 2006); Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (UK); Insolvency Service 
(United Kingdom) Director Disqualification & Restrictions (Insolvency Service, London, 2006) 
http://insolvency.gov.uk (accessed 23 September 2006) and Len Sealy "Directors Duties in the New 
Millennium" (2000) 21 Comp Law 64, 64 and Sealy "Directors' Duties Revisited", above n 163, 79-80. 
175  See above, Part V C 3 Duties to creditors and Part V C 55 Standard of care. 
 A CLOSELY-HELD COMPANIES ACT FOR NEW ZEALAND 569 
(4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(b), the actions that are alleged to have caused the breach shall 
be deemed to be reasonable if, at the time the actions are undertaken:176 
(a) The Closely-Held Company is able to pay its debts as they become due in the normal course 
of business; and  
(b) The value of the Closely-Held Company's assets is greater than the value of its liabilities, 
including contingent liabilities. 
This approach would deem any transaction that satisfied a solvency test to be reasonable. 
Principals that were willing to undertake the necessary steps to determine whether the solvency test 
is satisfied (probably by taking accounting advice) would be safe from liability to creditors. This 
would be an optional safe-harbour. 
7 Practical considerations: enforcement 
Enforcement of duties to creditors is a particular issue. Creditors may be reluctant to pursue 
actions against delinquent principals due to the time and cost involved. In particular, creditors are 
likely to be reluctant to "throw good money after bad" pursuing principals. This may be 
compounded if principals have adopted some of the asset protection mechanisms described in the 
preceding section.  
One method of improving enforcement is through mandatory liability insurance for principals. 
Principals could be required to insure against liability to creditors under the duties proposed above. 
This would ensure that creditors would be able to recover, even if principals have employed some 
measure of asset protection. Moreover, it could lower the costs of enforcement. If it was more 
economical for insurers to pay out valid claims, court action would not be necessary. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, if insurance was mandatory for all principals, then principals with a 
history of dereliction of duty to creditors would either pay much higher premiums or perhaps even 
be entirely uninsurable. The market would itself reduce the incidence of delinquent principals. 
Such a proposal would clearly be contingent on the availability of such insurance. In drafting 
this paper, a number of insurers offering "director and officer" insurance were contacted directly. 
While such insurance does exist for smaller companies, it is tailored more towards larger 
companies. Moreover, several of the insurers only provide insurance to directors/officers/principals 
with an established history of compliance with legal obligations. At least one other insurer's 
  
176  See, for example, Companies Act 1993, s 4, and Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 
330-333 and clause 3(3) (note that the Law Commission's formulation is preferred as it provides greater 
flexibility). See also, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), 51; Wyoming Limited Liability 
Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-119 (1977) and Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), above n 
3, s 406(a). 
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coverage for non-established principals excludes claims if the company becomes insolvent.177 New 
principals may therefore find it difficult to arrange the required insurance. Introducing a mandatory 
insurance requirement may create barriers for people to establish new closely-held companies. 
If the insurers were not willing or able to establish the requisite insurance market, an alternative 
would be to establish an "assetless company fund", as was recommended by the Law 
Commission,178 or to increase the scope of the existing Liquidation Surplus Account.179 This 
would effectively provide a legal aid fund to assist creditors in pursuing claims against delinquent 
principals. This would ensure that delinquent principals could be held to account, even where it may 
not otherwise be economically justifiable to pursue a claim. Draft clause(s) would depend on which 
approach is adopted. 
D Multi-Principal Closely-Held Companies  
1 Relations of principals to each other: default rules 
Multi-principal closely-held companies introduce some complications. The closely-held 
companies statute will need to provide certain rules relating to the relations of principals among 
themselves. Obviously, single-principal closely-held companies will be able to disregard such rules. 
These should be "default" rules, able to be modified by agreement.180 Default rules make matters as 
simple as possible for basic closely-held companies, while making allowance for the particular 
needs of individual companies if appropriate.181 
2 Rights of principals 
A consideration of comparative precedent reveals some fairly common themes for these default 
rules. First, they consider the rights of principals. These include the straightforward rights to be 
involved in the management of the closely-held company and to access information: 
 
  
177  Interview with B, anonymous insurer (the author, by telephone, 28 July 2006); correspondence with C, 
anonymous insurer (the author, by email, 19 July 2006); correspondence with D, anonymous insurer (the 
author, by email, 19 July 2006); and correspondence with Insurance Council (the author, by email, 18 July 
2006). As the information provided could be commercially sensitive, an undertaking not to disclose the 
detailed information was provided. 
178  See Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 647 and 710 and cls 243-249. 
179  See Companies Act 1993, s 316. See also Insolvency and Trustee Service "Liquidation Surplus Account" 
(December 2002) 13 Insolvency Quarterly Newsletter Wellington 5 www.insolvency.govt.nz (accessed 23 
September 2006). 
180  Modification of default rules is considered in the next section of this paper – see below, Part VI A 5
 Modification of default rules. 
181  See also above, Part IV D Flexibility, and below, Part VI A 5 Modification of default rules. 
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Draft Clause: Rights of Principals 
The Principal(s) of a Closely-Held Company have the right to: 
(a) Be involved in the management of the Closely-Held Company;182 and 
(b) Access all information relating to the affairs of the Closely-Held Company.183  
2 Shares, interests and distributions  
Second, it is necessary to make provision for dividing the interests in a closely-held company 
among principals. Again, the comparative precedents adopt a common approach. Contrary to 
company law, none of the comparative precedents provide for "shares". Only the South African 
statute makes express reference, by providing that interests are to be determined by way of 
percentage.184 The other statutes are silent, allowing principals to make their own arrangements if 
appropriate.185 Without express agreement to the contrary by the principals, however, the default 
position is for an even distribution of interests. This is a simple and seemingly effective approach, 
particularly for basic equal-share companies that will not vary the pro rata distribution of interests. 
Given a general duty to creditors has already been provided elsewhere,186 it is possible to stay silent 
as to interests, and provide a very simple approach to making distributions, for example: 
Draft Clause: Distributions 
A Closely-Held Company must make equal distributions among all its Principals.187 
3 Duties of principals to each other 
Next, and again similar to the rights described above, there are some common themes in terms 
of duties of principals. These include the straightforward accounting for property, disclosure of 
information, non-competition, and a general duty to comply with the requirements of the statute and 
operating agreement. A draft clause may read: 
  
182  See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 46(a); Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, 
Wyo Stat § 17-15-116 (1977); Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), above n 3, s 404(a) and 
Partnerships Act 1908, s 27(e). 
183  See, for example, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), ibid, s 408, and Partnerships Act 1908, s 
31. 
184  See Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 30(1). 
185  See, for example Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 12(e), and Partnerships Act 1908, s 27(a). See also 
below, Part VI A 5 Modification of default rules. 
186  See above, Part V C 66 Proposed duty of care. 
187  See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 46(f); Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, 
Wyo Stat § 17-15-119 (1977) and Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), above n 3, s 405(a). 
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Draft Clause: Duties of Principals to Each Other 
(1) The Principal(s) of a Closely-Held Company must: 
(a) Account to the other Principal(s) of the Closely-Held Company (if any) for any property, 
profit or other benefit derived in the course of conducting the Closely-Held Company's 
business;188 
(b) Keep the other Principal(s) of the Closely-Held Company (if any) informed of any matters 
that may reasonably affect the business of the Closely-Held Company or the position of the 
other Principal(s);189 
(c) Not compete in business with the Closely-Held Company or otherwise utilise the 
information or business opportunities of the Closely-Held Company for private gain;190 
and 
Not breach, or conduct the business of the Closely-Held Company in such a way that the 
Closely-Held
(d) 
 Company breaches, the Operating Agreement of the Closely-Held Company 
(2) cipal(s) of that Closely-
pany not party to the breach that suffer loss due to the breach. 
4 
 South Africa adopts a more traditional company law approach, and does not allow 
exit at will.193  
 
or this Act. 
A Principal that breaches the duty in subsection (1) is liable to the Prin
Held Com
Entry and exit 
It is also necessary to consider entry and exit rights of principals. While the comparative 
precedent is largely uniform in requiring the unanimous consent of existing principals to introduce a 
new principal, there is no consistent approach to exit rights of principals. The United States191 and 
New Zealand partnership law,192 for example, provides by default that principals have the right to 
exit at any time.
 
188  See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 42(2)(b)(i); Uniform Limited Liability Company 
Act (1996), above n 3, s 409(b)(1) and Partnerships Act 1908, ss 23, 24 and 32. 
189  See, for example, Partnerships Act 1908, s 31; Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 42(2)(b)(ii) and 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), ibid, s 408. 
190  See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 42(2)(b)(iii); Uniform Limited Liability Company 
Act (1996), ibid, s 409(b)(3) and Partnerships Act 1908, ss 32-33. 
191  See, for example, Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-120 (1977); Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act (1996), ibid, s 602(a). Note however this may be due to the United States' 
tax position – see Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), prefatory note, 1. 
192  Partnerships Act 1908, s 29. 
193  See Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), ss 33-40. 
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Allowing withdrawal at will would limit the potential for disputes to arise, as an aggrieved 
principal could withdraw at any time. On the other hand, it may also lead to business uncertainty if 
business partners can at any time go their own way, taking their capital with them.194 This business 
uncertainty may be able to be managed through appropriate notice and transitional requirements in 
the statute.  
This paper is inclined towards the United States exit-at-will approach due to its ability to limit 
disputes, but this is a finely balanced matter. A draft clause may read: 
Draft Clause: Entry and Exit of Principals 
(1) No person may become a Principal of a Closely-Held Company without the unanimous consent 
of the other Principal(s).195 
(2) The Principal(s) of a Closely-Held Company have the right to exit from the Closely-Held 
Company at any time.196 
It would, however, also be necessary to include some ancillary provisions relating to matters 
such as the nature of an interest that is transferred contrary to subsection (1),197 the process and 
timeframes for exit under subsection (2),198 and for liability before and after exit or entry.199 These 
are detailed matters outside the scope of this paper, however. 
5 Modification of default rules 
As discussed, the above should be default rules to make matters as simple as possible for basic 
closely-held companies.200 Also as discussed, it is necessary to make allowances for the particular 
needs of individual closely-held companies. Most importantly, there should be sufficient flexibility 
to allow principals to arrange internal matters to suit their particular circumstances, including 
modifying the default rules. 
  
194  See also Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 206-207. 
195  See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 33; Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo 
Stat §§ 17-15-122 and 17-15-144(b) (1977) and Partnerships Act 1908, s 27(g).  
196  See, for example, Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-120 (1977); Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act (1996), above n 3, s 602(a) and Partnerships Act 1908, s 29. 
197  See, for example, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), ibid, s 502 and Partnerships Act 1908, s 
34(1). 
198  See, for example, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), ibid, ss 601(1) and s 603(a)(1). 
199  See, for example, Partnerships Act 1908, ss 20 and 39(3). 
200  See above, Part IV D Flexibility. 
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The Companies Act anticipates this through the use of company constitutions,201 but only to a 
degree.202 The United States203 and South African204 closely-held companies statutes, and even 
New Zealand partnership law,205 expressly provide for much greater flexibility. The default rules 
relating to relationships of principals among themselves, as well as the powers and functions of 
principals, are expressly subject to modification by agreement. This greater flexibility seems 
appropriate for the new closely-held companies statute. This paper therefore proposes the following 
clause: 
Draft Clause: Operating Agreement 
(1) A Closely-Held Company may have an Operating Agreement to:206 
(a) Regulate the operation of the business of that Closely-Held Company; and 
(b) Govern the relations among the Principal(s) of that Closely-Held Company. 
(2) The Principal(s) of a Closely-Held having an Operating Agreement must act in accordance with 
the provisions of that Operating Agreement.207 
Adopting an operating agreement would require the unanimous agreement of principals, as an 
operating agreement is binding on all principals. Unanimous agreement would also be required to 
amend or revoke an operating agreement. An additional consequence of this is that it is effectively 
possible to act outside the operating agreement if all principals agree: 
(3) An Operating Agreement may be adopted, replaced, amended or revoked at any time by the 
unanimous agreement of the Principal(s) of the Closely-Held Company.208 
It is also necessary to consider whether this flexibility to arrange internal affairs should be 
unrestricted, or have certain limitations placed on it. Some matters should clearly be capable of 
  
201  See Companies Act 1993, Part V. 
202  See, in particular, Companies Act 1993, s 31(1). 
203  See, for example, Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-107(a)(xi) (1977) and 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), above n 3, s 103. 
204  See Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), ss 44 and 46. 
205  See Partnerships Act 1908, s 22. 
206  See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 44; Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo 
Stat § 17-15-107(a)(xi) (1977) and Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), above n 3, s 103. 
207  See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 44(4) and Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(1996), ibid, s 409(d). 
208  See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), ss 44(1) and 44(6) and Uniform Limited Liability 
Company Act (1996), ibid, s 103(a). 
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being modified by agreement. Matters such as the proportion of distributions among principals will 
be modified almost as a matter of course. Other matters, such as entry and exit rights, should 
similarly be able to be modified to suit individual circumstances. Even the assorted directors' duties 
to each other may be dispensed with (or at least breaches ratified by unanimous agreement) in 
appropriate circumstances. All the comparative precedents allow for modification of these 
matters.209 
The rights of principals to access information and be involved in the management of the closely-
held company may be considered more important. The general scheme of the proposed closely-held 
companies statute is that substantial regulatory requirements are not required. But this is based on 
the premise that involvement in management obviates the need for regulatory requirements. 
Limiting a principal's involvement in management and/or access to information is more akin to a 
company-style approach of separate directors and shareholders. As discussed, this is a situation that 
may be abused, hence the need for regulatory requirements. It may therefore not be appropriate to 
allow principals to alter these rights by agreement.  
Although no comparative precedents prohibit the alteration of these rights by agreement, some 
provide that they may not be unreasonably restricted.210 This strikes a balance between respecting 
the ability of principals to decide for themselves211 and acknowledging the accountability concerns 
if someone is a principal of a closely-held company without any access to information or 
involvement in management. The majority of the comparative precedent, however, allows even the 
information and management rights to be modified, presumably on the basis of allowing people to 
decide for themselves. The only limitation is that such modifications cannot be "inconsistent with 
the law".212  
This paper prefers the former view for the reasons outlined, notwithstanding the fact that the 
majority of comparative precedent favours the latter. These matters are so fundamental that they 
should not be subject to exclusion: 
(4) The provisions of an Operating Agreement may: 
  
209  See Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), ss 44 and 46; Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat 
§ 17-15-107 (1977); Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), ibid, s 103 and Partnerships Act 1908, 
ss 22 and 27. 
210  See, for example, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), ibid, s 103(b). 
211  Goddard "Company Law Reforms – Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", above n 19, 166. 
212  See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), ss 44(1)(b) and 46 and Wyoming Limited Liability 
Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-107(a)(xi) (1977).  
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(a) Modify any of the provisions of sections [Distributions], [Duties of Principals to Each 
Other], and [Entry and Exit of Principals] without restriction;213 and 
(b) Modify any of the provisions of section [Rights of Principals], but only where it is 
reasonable to do so.214 
6 Creditors and balancing mechanisms 
This paper proposes imposing a duty on principals of closely-held companies in favour of 
creditors. The discussion of these duties above215 used the example of one-principal closely-held 
companies to avoid the potential complications that may arise with multi-person companies.216 
There does not seem to be any reason why matters should become overly-complicated simply 
because multiple principals become involved in a closely-held company. There is no difference 
between several principals and one principal owing the duties to creditors as outlined in this paper.  
The balancing mechanisms associated with competing duties are nominally more complicated. 
As discussed, company law traditional uses a duty to "the company" to resolve disputes.217 This 
does not seem necessary, however, even in the case of multiple principals. It is difficult to envisage 
a situation where the very basic duty not to prejudice the position of creditors will conflict with any 
of the duties to other principals. In the event that it does, this paper proposes a hierarchy of 
duties,218 with the duty to creditors taking precedence over the duties to other principals (so long as 
there is a causative link between the wrongful act and the loss to creditors). For the reasons outlined 
above, this seems a far simpler method than utilising the balancing mechanism.219 
B Remedies 
1 General: criminal versus civil remedies 
The remedies for any breach of the duties to creditors and other principals also need to be 
considered. There are two broad options for remedies: criminal and civil remedies. 
  
213  See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), ss 44 and 46; Wyoming Limited Liability Company 
Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-107 (1977); Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), above n 3, s 103 and 
Partnerships Act 1908, ss 22 and 27. 
214  See, for example, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), ibid, s 103(b). 
215  See above, Part V C 4 Balancing mechanisms versus direct regulatory requirements. 
216  See above, n 146. 
217  See above, Part V C 4 Balancing mechanisms versus direct regulatory requirements. 
218  See also Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 194-195. 
219  See above, Part V C 4 Balancing mechanisms versus direct regulatory requirements. 
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The Companies Act imposes a range of criminal sanctions for breach of its assorted regulatory 
requirements.220 It is not clear that this is the most effective approach for enforcement. 
Prosecutorial discretion means that many of the more minor offences will never be prosecuted,221 
particularly where no-one suffers any harm or loss. Moreover, the criminal law has a higher burden 
of proof, is slow, and has more restrictive rules of evidence. This is likely to be aggravated by the 
complexities of both company law and the modern commercial environment.222 The criminal law 
has therefore been described as a "blunt and largely ineffective instrument for ensuring that 
technical or administrative duties are complied with".223   
 
South Africa, for example, has made a conscious choice to "decriminalise" many of the breaches 
of the Close Corporations Act.224 The primary remedy for any breach of the law is to impose 
personal civil liability. The basic approach is that a person who does not comply with the regulatory 
requirements of the Close Corporations Act forfeits the privileges associated with it – in particular, a 
person in breach effectively loses the protections of limited liability by incurring personal 
liability.225 Civil liability also has the effect of greater emphasis on self-enforcement. This means 
that enforcement will only be pursued where someone has suffered actual harm.226 This approach 
seems appropriate. This paper recommends that only civil remedies be imposed for breaches of 
duties. It may be necessary to impose criminal remedies for fraudulent behaviour,227 but this would 
be an exception to the general approach. 
2 Specific remedies 
In terms of specific civil remedies, given the nature of creditors' interests, any civil remedy for 
creditors will almost inevitably be in the form of damages. For breach of duties to other principals, 
an account of profits will frequently arise as the most appropriate remedy, as well as damages. Both 
of these are well-established remedies. 
 
220  See Companies Act 1993, Part XXI. 
221  The most high-profile incident is perhaps that involving David Parker and unanimous resolutions not to 
appoint an auditor – see Ian Wishart "Attorney-General Caught Filing False Documents" (20 March 2006) 
Investigate Magazine, New Zealand www.investigatemagazine.com (accessed 6 August 2006). 
222  See S Du Toit and J J Henning "South Africa – Corporate Law Reform and the Empowerment of the 
Victims of Economic Crime" (1999) 20 Comp Law 277, 281. 
223  Ibid, 283. See also the similar recommendations of the Cooney Report, above n 31, paras 13.10-13.15. 
224  Du Toit and Henning, ibid, 280-284. See also Cooney Report, ibid, paras 13.10-13.12. 
225  Du Toit and Henning, ibid, 283. 
226  Du Toit and Henning, ibid, 283. This approach was also recommended for New Zealand by the Law 
Commission – see Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 318, 564, 565 and 585.  
227  For example, filing false documents or general use of the corporate form to defraud – see Companies Act 
1993, ss 377, 379 and 380. 
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One additional remedy that may be appropriate, however, is giving the court the power to (with 
the consent of the other principals) expel a principal from the closely-held company when they have 
breached their duties. Such a remedy is provided in South Africa.228 As for the right to exit a 
closely-held company,229 the most effective way to resolve a dispute may be to require quarrelling 
principals to go their separate ways.  
These remedies would be available to the court, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the 
operating agreement of the closely-held company (in particular, relating to the exit of principals). 
While the operating agreement can alter what amounts to a breach, once that breach is established, it 
should not be able to limit the court's available range of remedies. Limiting the available remedies 
may impair the court's ability to adequately address an actual breach and ensure justice in the 
individual case. 
This paper therefore proposes the following be implemented: 
Draft Clause: Remedies 
(1) Despite anything in the Operating Agreement, where a Principal is liable under section [Duties of 
Principals to Creditors] or [Duties of Principals to Each Other], the Court may, to the extent that 
it is just and reasonable, order that the Principal:230 
(a) Pay damages to the person that has suffered loss due to the breach; 
(b) Pay a sum up to the amount of personal profit made or loss avoided by that Principal to the 
person that has suffered loss due to the breach; and/or 
(c) Be expelled from the Closely-Held Company.231 
(2) The Court may make an order under subsection (1)(c) only with the consent of the other 
Principal(s) of the Closely-Held Company.  
It would also be necessary to provide for ancillary matters related to an expulsion order, 
including the appropriate payout (if any) for the expelled partner, the timeframe for such payout, 
and liability before and after expulsion.232 The detail of these provisions is outside the scope of this 
paper. 
  
228  See Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 36. 
229  See above, Part VI A 4 Entry and exit. 
230  See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 42(3) and Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(1996), above n 3, ss 409-410. 
231  See Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 36. 
232  These provisions will be similar to those for the exit of principals – see above, Part VI A 4 Entry and 
exit. 
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C Transacting Business 
It is necessary to provide, for the avoidance of doubt, that closely-held companies have full legal 
capacity to transact business. The alternative, the ultra vires doctrine, is not appropriate in the New 
Zealand environment.233 This also caters to the potentially informal manner of conducting business 
by closely-held companies, by allowing closely-held companies to undertake all actions that the 
principals themselves are able to do: 
Draft Clause: Capacity of Closely-Held Companies 
A Closely-Held Company has all the rights, powers and legal capacity of a natural person.234 
It is also necessary to consider how closely-held companies go about practically transacting 
business. Obviously, legal persons such as companies cannot act for themselves. The Companies 
Act, for example, generally empowers the board of a company to manage it,235 with agents used in 
order to transact business on a day-to-day basis. Theoretically at least, board authorisation is 
necessary to appoint a person an agent of a company. The technicalities of agency law are, however, 
probably beyond the standard closely-held company. As discussed in the empirical findings of this 
paper, the majority of a closely-held company's business will be transacted by the principals 
themselves.236  
Again the comparative precedent provides a more appropriate approach for closely-held 
companies. The default rule is that all principals are deemed to be the agents of the company. This is 
a simple approach that is particularly suitable for closely-held companies: 
Draft Clause: Transacting Business 
(1) All Principal(s) of the Closely-Held Company are its agents for the purpose of its business.237  
  
233  See Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 95 and 342-348. 
234  See, for example, Companies Act 1993, ss 15-17; Law Commission Company Law Report draft bill, clauses 
7-8; Incorporated Societies Act 1908, s 10; Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s2(2); Wyoming Limited 
Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-104 (1977) and Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), 
above n 3, s 112(b). 
235  Companies Act 1993, s 128. 
236  See above, Part II A 11 Synonymity. Note in particular that some 63 per cent of businesses have no 
employees at all – see above, n 16. 
237  See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 54; Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo 
Stat § 17-15-117 (1977); Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), above n 3, s 301 and Partnerships 
Act 1908, ss 8 and 9. 
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New Zealand, however, has a particularly strong focus on form-over-substance in corporate 
law.238 Notwithstanding the generality of proposed subsection (1), it may be appropriate to provide 
a safe-harbour provision for closely-held companies: 
(2) Any act by a Principal of a Closely-Held Company who uses the expression "[NAME OF 
PRINCIPAL], Principal, for [NAME OF CLOSELY-HELD COMPANY]" in doing the act is 
deemed to be the act of that Closely-Held Company. 
This would deem any transaction using the particular expression to be a transaction of the 
closely-held company. This safe-harbour would provide additional guidance for principals of 
closely-held companies, and ensure that potential liability "traps" do not arise through ignorance or 
oversight of the law. 
D Accounting Records and Other Obligations 
One obligation often set out in company law relates to accounting or financial reporting 
obligations. Such requirements can be particularly burdensome and without apparent benefit for 
closely-held companies.239 Any benefits that may be derived from such financial records can 
equally be derived from other statutory reporting obligations – in particular, annual tax returns.240 A 
tax return is equally able to achieve any goals such as assessing the performance of the business in 
the previous financial year, imposing business disciplines, or encouraging good decision making. 
This approach is adopted in other jurisdictions.241 Any other financial records that are practically 
necessary or useful (for example, in the context of considering the solvency test) will be prepared or 
commissioned by the closely-held company as needed or desired, not by regulatory compulsion. 
There does not seem to be any need to set out any other obligations in the closely-held 
companies statute, other than some administrative requirements relating to registration and winding 
up. In relation to the latter, it is probably most appropriate to simply incorporate by reference the 
existing provisions of the Companies Act. This is a more complicated and technical area of law that 
is normally conducted by specialists, not by closely-held companies in their day-to-day activities. 
Additional complexity can therefore be justified.242 
  
238  See, for example, Trevor Ivory Ltd v Anderson [1992] 2 NZLR 517 (CA) and Ede (trading as Electro 
Sheetmetals Ltd) v J A Russell Ltd (2001) 9 NZCLC 262,539 (HC). 
239  See above, Part V C Creditors, Limited Liability and Regulatory Requirements, in particular n 36 
and following. 
240  Tax Administration Act 1994, s 33. In New Zealand at least, there is no obligation to file financial reports 
publicly for the majority of companies. The private nature of tax returns therefore does not matter. 
241  There are no reporting requirements in either the Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat title 
17 chapter 15 (1977) or the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996).  
242  Goddard "Company Law Reforms – Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", above n 19, 163. 
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E Formalities 
Finally, in light of the informality of closely-held companies,243 it may be appropriate to 
provide that even matters required under the statute do not have to comply with any particular level 
of formality (other than perhaps matters which must be sent to the Registrar of Closely-Held 
Companies, such as applications to incorporate a closely-held company): 
Draft Clause: Formalities 
Every matter contemplated by this Act may be done informally (including, without limitation, not in 
writing).244 
V CONCLUSION 
This paper has attempted to show how the Companies Act is inadequate for closely-held 
companies in New Zealand. The essential problem of the Companies Act is that the regulatory 
requirements imposed on directors to ensure accountability to shareholders do not have any benefit 
where the directors of a company are also its shareholders. With no benefit, the costs arising from 
such regulatory requirements are therefore unjustified. This problem is effectively acknowledged in 
the Companies Act through the assorted concessions to closely-held companies. These concessions 
have their own problems, however, particularly in terms of compliance costs. 
This paper has therefore proposed enacting a new statute designed to meet the needs of closely-
held companies. It has argued that this statute should be in addition to the existing Companies Act; 
it is not possible for one statute to cater to the needs of both widely- and closely-held companies. 
This new statute should be based on principles of accessibility and flexibility. From these general 
principles and a comparison of international precedent, the paper has set out some key features that 
are considered appropriate for a closely-held companies statute in New Zealand. While these 
proposals share many common origins with the Companies Act 1993, the paper has attempted to 
remove many of the undesirable aspects of that statute for closely-held companies. 
This net result of this paper's proposals is a simple, flexible set of requirements suitable for 
closely-held companies in New Zealand, without onerous or unjustified compliance requirements. 
The paper argues that such a statute should be implemented to meet the needs of closely-held 
companies in New Zealand. 
  
243  See above, Part 2 Informality. 
244  See, for example, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), above n 3, s 103(a). 
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